Copper Prices Surge While Former “Copper King” Who Outpaced Huawei and Tencent Falls into Decline

This year’s global rush for copper has driven prices higher, spotlighting companies and entrepreneurs closely tied to the metal such as Zijin Mining, Jiangxi Copper and Luoyang Molybdenum. In contrast, Wang Wenyin and his Zhengwei Group — once celebrated as the world’s leading copper conglomerate and, at its peak, a Guangdong private-sector giant with annual revenue exceeding ¥700 billion — now confront heavy indebtedness, protracted litigation and repeated listings as dishonest debtors, leaving the empire in a state of visible decline.

Even at the height of its prominence, Zhengwei Group maintained a low public profile. The company was not publicly listed and did not disclose audited financials, so outside assessments relied largely on corporate claims and industry reports. Zhengwei’s own statements described a global footprint with domestic headquarters including Shenzhen and international offices across Asia, Europe and the Americas, asserting leadership in metal-based new materials and claiming extensive industrial parks, mining areas and exploration rights with proved mineral resources valued in the trillions of yuan.

Zhengwei’s revenue crossed the ¥100 billion threshold in 2011 and the group entered the Fortune Global 500 in 2013. By 2020, reported revenue had surpassed ¥600 billion, and in 2022 the company recorded revenue of more than ¥720 billion, ranking fourth among China’s top 500 private enterprises and exceeding the reported revenues of Huawei, Tencent and Country Garden, earning the designation of Guangdong’s leading private enterprise.

Industry accounts from 2016 indicated Zhengwei controlled significant copper reserves across more than 20 countries, with estimates then suggesting the group held roughly 30 million tonnes of copper reserves. Against a backdrop of global reserve estimates near 700 million tonnes in 2015 and China’s copper reserves surpassing 100 million tonnes in 2016, Zhengwei’s holdings at the time were reported as a notable share of global and national resources. These figures contributed to Wang’s reputation as the “world copper king.”

The group’s deterioration began to surface publicly in 2022. In September of that year, a dispute over ¥43.62 million led the Luolong District People’s Court in Luoyang to place Zhengwei on the list of discredited persons subject to enforcement. Subsequent reports documented production halts at several industrial parks, auctioning of equity and assets, and the emergence of numerous litigation filings by creditors and business partners. Both Wang and his spouse were later added to the list of dishonest debtors. Aggregated corporate registry and media data indicate that since 2022 more than 80 lawsuits naming Wang or Zhengwei as defendants have been recorded, involving banks, partners and other claimants with asserted amounts exceeding ¥10 billion. Wang has markedly reduced his public appearances since the crisis escalated.

Wang’s entrepreneurial story began in 1993 when he left Shanghai Gaoqiao Petrochemical, arriving in Shenzhen with minimal funds. He worked his way up from manual roles to managerial positions and then to a lucrative commission-based post at Hitachi, where he reportedly earned significant remuneration that seeded his first major entrepreneurial venture. In 1995 Wang established Shenzhen Xiewei Cable Factory, which later evolved into Zhengwei Group.

Wang cultivated a long-standing ambition to build a global enterprise and expanded aggressively through a series of strategic investments timed to exploit market disruptions. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis he acquired production equipment and scaled operations at low cost; during the 2003 SARS period he invested heavily in copper mining and upstream integration, acquiring reserves and establishing a large refined copper facility; and during the 2008 global financial shock he purchased overseas copper-processing assets and established international headquarters, building a multinational footprint that underpinned Zhengwei’s rapid ascent.

Despite a self-portrayal as an avid reader and lifelong learner, Wang’s later expansion strategy encountered mounting obstacles. After 2010, as national policy emphasized industrial upgrading and as regional governments promoted industrial parks, Zhengwei pursued an extensive program of park development and land acquisition in collaboration with various local authorities. The group also made substantial investments in Evergrande, including a reported ¥5 billion capital injection in 2017 and additional support during Evergrande’s later difficulties. Zhengwei remains listed as a shareholder in Evergrande Real Estate.

Those strategic moves ultimately exposed the company to concentration and execution risks. Traditional sectors such as copper wire and cable faced cyclical headwinds, while capital-intensive ventures in semiconductors and new materials required sustained investment and long development timelines. Rapid expansion strained liquidity, and multiple projects stalled or became effectively abandoned. Field investigations and media reports have documented examples of inactive industrial parks, sealed facilities with unpaid wages and mortgaged equipment, and sites where routine maintenance like grass removal became the principal ongoing activity.

Observers note that Zhengwei’s approach often combined industrial project development with subsequent real estate conversion of acquired land. With the real estate market’s adjustment, many of the group’s speculative assumptions deteriorated, leaving a substantial portion of invested projects incomplete or non-performing. The combination of high leverage, litigation exposure and the decline in operational activity has materially altered the fortunes of a group that once dominated the copper industry.