Build "the next Berkshire" in the flames of war! Ackman's fund begins roadshow: IPO priced at $50, once again targeting "reverse betting" strategy.

On April 13th, Bill Ackman, the legendary investor on Wall Street, officially launched the closed-end fund Pershing Square USA Ltd. (PSUS), under the management company Pershing Square Inc. (PS), with a joint IPO roadshow. The IPO is priced at $50 per share and plans to raise $5-10 billion through a combination of public fundraising and private placement, with the IPO pricing date scheduled for April 28th and trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Ackman's Contrarian Logic Amid the intense market volatility due to the conflict involving GEO Group Inc., Ackman once again found himself in the spotlight. Just before the roadshow started, talks between the U.S. and Iran in Pakistan failed to reach an agreement on core issues such as nuclear matters and sanctions, leading President Trump to announce a comprehensive blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by the U.S. military. This led to a surge in Brent crude oil futures in Asian early trading and a decline in U.S. stock index futures. While many companies have put their IPO plans on hold due to increased political and economic uncertainty surrounding GEO Group Inc., Ackman's fund's marketing activities continued. After a first quarter of sporadic IPO activity, discussions have shifted towards the effects of intense conflicts and ongoing AI panic. Amidst the uncertainty surrounding many companies and their IPO plans due to the GEO Group Inc. conflict, the decision to list the fund represents Ackman's unique understanding of market logic and is a strategic continuation of his two-year cycle of "trial-error-improvement-restart." In his letter to investors, Ackman bluntly stated that the current market chaos is "not a bug, but a feature." His core logic lies in the market panic-driven selloff caused by the GEO Group Inc. conflict, which creates the best window of opportunity to buy quality companies at a low price. Historical experience supports this judgment - in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Ackman accurately shorted positions worth around $27 million and eventually earned a return of $2.6 billion, becoming one of the most representative battles in his investment career. Performance data further endorses Ackman's investment capabilities. In 2025, Pershing Square recorded an annual return of 34%, nearly double the performance of the S&P 500 index; over the past eight years, the fund has an annualized return rate of 23%, far exceeding the broad market's 14%. As of the end of 2025, Pershing Square's assets under management totaled approximately $30.7 billion, with fee-generating assets of $20.7 billion, 96% of which are "permanent capital," meaning investors do not have the right to redeem or withdraw their investments, allowing the company to adhere to long-term investment strategies and avoid forced asset sales in market turmoil. At the same time, Ackman's judgment of the future macro environment is also bold. According to Polymarket prediction data, the market estimates a 29% probability of the U.S. economy entering a recession by the end of 2026, and the recession contract price has closely followed the trend in oil prices since the outbreak of the conflict. Ackman's logic is that if a recession does occur, asset prices will further be under pressure, and as he holds billions of dollars in new capital, he will become the most influential "buyer" in the market. Structural innovation after previous failed listings However, this IPO attempt by Ackman is not his first. In 2024, he attempted to raise up to $25 billion for a closed-end fund, which was once hailed as the "largest IPO in U.S. history." However, the plan met with setbacks - the fundraising target was reduced from $25 billion to $4 billion and then to $2 billion, cornerstone investors withdrew, and ultimately Ackman withdrew the application a few days before the pricing. The root cause of that failure lies not only in the underperformance of Ackman's European closed-end fund at the time but also in the market awkwardness of the closed-end fund structure itself: unlike ETFs or mutual funds, closed-end funds have fixed shares after an IPO, and investors can only trade on the secondary market, with their trading prices often persistently lower than the net asset value (NAV), resulting in a stubborn "discount" problem. Ackman's own Pershing Square Holdings Ltd., listed in London, is a prime example - the fund, which manages approximately $15 billion in fee-generating assets, has traded at a discount of over 25% for a long time, severely eroding investor's actual returns. To break through this dilemma, Ackman designed a new "dual-listing + free shares" structure in the 2026 version. The core innovation of this joint IPO is that for every 100 shares of PSUS closed-end fund shares subscribed by investors (at $50 per share), they will receive 20 free shares of the management company PS. Barron's estimates that this is equivalent to about 10% additional value. Institutional investors participating in the private placement - locking in $28 billion in funding from qualified investors such as family offices, pension funds, and insurance companies - receive a generous clause where they receive 30 free PS shares for every 100 shares subscribed. The advantage of this design is that it associates the structural deficiencies of closed-end funds with the upside potential of ownership in the management company, creating a "closed-loop logic": after the successful IPO of PSUS, a significant amount of fee-generating assets will be added, directly boosting the financial performance of the management company, and PSUS investors, holding PS shares, can also share in the dividends of this added management fee. In other words, Ackman is attempting to transform the traditional "fund and manager" relationship into an "asset and platform" cooperation mechanism, emulating Buffett's structure at Berkshire Hathaway. Ackman's "Berkshire Roadmap" This IPO is not an isolated event but the latest step in Ackman's "Berkshirefication" strategy. His long-term goal is to build Pershing Square into a modern version of a holding company similar to Buffett's, obtaining stable management fee income through the "permanent capital" platform, and holding onto high-quality companies in a highly concentrated way. As of the end of 2025, Pershing Square held only 13 stocks, with core holdings including Alphabet (GOOGL.US), Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN.US), and the recently heavily-weighted Meta (META.US) - the latter representing an investment of approximately $20 billion, accounting for 10% of the fund's portfolio. After the IPO failure in 2024, Ackman subsequently increased his stake in Howard Hughes Corporation (HHH.US) from around 37% to nearly 47% and gained control of 40% of the company's voting rights. His goal is to transform this real estate company into a holding company for the acquisition of majority stakes in other companies, once again confirming Ackman's commitment to the "holding company model." Now, the PSUS/PS joint IPO has pushed this blueprint into a new phase. The listing is underwritten by Citigroup, UBS Group AG, Bank of America Corp, Jefferies Financial Group Inc., and Wells Fargo & Company, with Ackman, Chief Investment Officer Ryan Israel, and five other executives controlling the majority voting rights of PS after the IPO. Meanwhile, Ackman's recent other major move - the acquisition of Universal Music Group for 9.4 billion in cash and stock and its transfer to a U.S. listing - is also seen as a key move in the "Berkshirefication" game plan, aimed at deploying capital into high-quality assets with durable moats and stable cash flows. However, this listing also comes with risks. Despite Ackman's endorsement with a 34% return rate in 2025 and the $28 billion cornerstone investment locked in, this contrarian fundraising still faces three core risks: changes in market risk preferences due to the U.S.-Iran conflict could offset the advantage of building positions at low prices; the reputation of Ackman's European closed-end fund for trading at a discount of over 25% raises doubts among investors about whether the "free shares of the management company" can truly hedge against discount losses; and investors who are interested in holding U.S. large-cap stocks may not be willing to passively hold a minority stake in a hedge fund management company, yet post-IPO Ackman's team will firmly hold on to control through preferred shares mechanisms, further heightening concerns over the misalignment of liquidity discounts and governance.