A three-day simulation of a chip game: Chong Kin GP (01609) broke the record with a deep V from an off-market price of HK$501 on the first day.

CHONG KIN GP (01609) interpreted "fanatical" and "calm" to the fullest within a short 48 hours. From the pre-IPO stage with a temporary surge of 408% in liquidity illusion, to the listing day (May 5) opening high and closing low, with an amplitude exceeding 98% of long and short killings, to the next day (May 6) stock price returning to the cruel reality of the issue valuation central axis, investors witnessed the whole process of the irrational prosperity and collapse of this "domestic sports medicine first stock". 7823 times oversubscription Amplifying chip scarcity in illiquidity During the pre-IPO trading on May 4, CHONG KIN GP showed extreme valuation premiums and significant liquidity differentiation. The intra-day price soared to 501 Hong Kong dollars, a premium of 408.6% compared to the issue price of 98.5 Hong Kong dollars, ending at 309.2 Hong Kong dollars, an increase of 213.91%. Calculated per lot of 50 shares, each lot had a book profit of over 10,000 Hong Kong dollars during the pre-IPO period. The nature of this abnormal surge is a liquidity premium created by an extremely unbalanced supply-demand structure. Public information shows that CHONG KIN GP's Hong Kong public offering recorded a 7823 times oversubscription, with valid applications exceeding 300,000 shares, while the public offering shares were only 842,200 shares, with a low allocation rate of 1.5%. The very low public float allowed a few allottees to control the short-term pricing authority, and the surge in the pre-IPO period was undoubtedly the extreme magnification of chip scarcity in illiquidity. A more noteworthy signal comes from the pricing differentiation on pre-IPO platforms: Futu's pre-IPO ended at 342 Hong Kong dollars, Bright's pre-IPO at 310.8 Hong Kong dollars, while TGM's pre-IPO remained at the issue price of 98.5 Hong Kong dollars. This significant price difference indicates that international allocation parties had already initiated systematic selling in the pre-IPO stage, laying the foundation for pressure on the market on the first day of listing. Behind the game of opening high and closing low Most funds secured profits On May 5, CHONG KIN GP officially started trading, showing typical characteristics of "opening high and closing low, massive turnover," with the market quickly returning to rationality after extreme excitement, leading to a fierce battle between long and short positions. The opening price was set at 288 Hong Kong dollars, a substantial gap-up of 192.39% compared to the issue price, seemingly continuing the strong sentiment from the pre-IPO, but actually hiding concerns. Compared to the pre-IPO closing price of 309.2 Hong Kong dollars, the opening price was already discounted by about 6.9%, and retreated over 42% from the pre-IPO high, indicating that the profits accumulated in the pre-IPO period had been cashed in during the opening stage. On that day, the Hang Seng Index and the Hang Seng Tech Index both fell by over 1% and 2% respectively. Despite overall market pressure, CHONG KIN GP recorded a trading volume of 329 million Hong Kong dollars, with a first day turnover rate of 5.91%, indicating a fierce battle between long and short positions within a wide price range. In the opening session, the stock price quickly surged to 299 Hong Kong dollars within half an hour, approaching a 200% increase, which coincided with a critical resistance level compared to the issue price. With ample liquidity in the morning, chasing funds and profit-taking intersected here, and the surge in prices was essentially a desperate move by the bulls, triggering the collapse of the logic of reluctance to sell in the pre-IPO and becoming a rallying cry for the bears, with the price never returning to this high point afterward. After reaching the high of 299 Hong Kong dollars, the stock price experienced a three-stage accelerated decline: the first stage dropped from 299 Hong Kong dollars to 260 Hong Kong dollars, corresponding to the concentration of profit-taking in the pre-IPO period; the second stage fell from 260 Hong Kong dollars to 240 Hong Kong dollars, with international placement chips starting to join the sell-off; the third stage dropped from 240 Hong Kong dollars to the intra-day low of 222.4 Hong Kong dollars, triggering stop-loss orders from those who chased the rally. More crucially, CHONG KIN GP's issuance did not include an over-allotment option (green shoe mechanism), lacking the support of stable market institutions. When the selling pressure was concentrated, the market could only rely on spontaneous forces to absorb it, exacerbating the volatility of the stock price. In the afternoon, the market entered a phase of consolidating on lower volume, with most of the trading completed in the morning. Although prices continued to decline in the afternoon, the trading volume significantly reduced. By the closing, the stock price was at 215 Hong Kong dollars, an increase of 116.5% from the issue price, with the market value dropping to 11.8 billion Hong Kong dollars. It is worth noting that the stock's first-day trading volume was 3.2417 million shares, with a turnover rate of 5.91%, indicating that nearly 6% of the shares in circulation changed hands in a single day. This figure needs to be compared: during the pre-IPO stage, there were only 842,200 shares available for public trading, with less than 50,000 shares traded, meaning that most of the selling pressure on the first day came from the international placement portion. In the 3.24 million shares traded, the international placement shares dominated the selling side. Institutional investors who received cheap chips during the IPO chose to exit on the first day opportunistically. Panic selling on the next day and the tug of war for value return On May 6, the trading of CHONG KIN GP exhibited the typical characteristics of "exploring the bottom and rebounding," as the market entered a crucial phase of chip settlement and revaluation following the previous day's intense battle. In the opening auction phase, the stock opened at 220.000 Hong Kong dollars, but encountered concentrated selling pressure from the bears, quickly dropping to 191.200 Hong Kong dollars, hitting a new low since listing. This low point was about 11.1% lower than the previous day's closing price of 215.000 Hong Kong dollars, reflecting that the rebound from the previous day had not effectively absorbed the selling pressure, leading to panic selling in the market again. However, after reaching the range of 190-200 Hong Kong dollars, there was a clear emergence of proactive buying orders, pushing the price gradually back up. By the closing, the stock was at 217.800 Hong Kong dollars, up 1.30% from the previous close, with an intraday rebound of 13.9% from the low point, placing the closing price at the 62nd percentile of the day's price range (191.200-220.000 Hong Kong dollars), indicating that the bulls successfully organized a counterattack in the lower range and brought the price back above the previous day's close. In terms of volume, the trading volume for that day was 49.68 million shares, with a turnover rate of 0.906%, significantly lower than the turnover rate of 5.91% on the first day of listing. This change indicates that after intense turnover on the first day, the degree of chip locking had increased. Interpreting the main intentions: how is the cycle of premium creation, distribution at highs, and chip absorption at lows interlocked? Revisiting the trends of CHONG KIN GP in the pre-IPO, first day, and second day, the complete operation path of main funds of "creating premium - distributing at highs - absorbing chips at lows" is clear and discernible. During the pre-IPO stage (May 4), main funds cleverly used the supply-demand imbalance to create a "liquidity illusion," forming a meticulously designed "trap for bulls": by creating extreme gains for retail investors in the pre-IPO, they attracted funds that chased the rally on the first day, while the international placement chips quietly started counter-selling in the pre-IPO stage. On the first day (May 5), the main funds completed the distribution at highs. The opening price of 288 Hong Kong dollars provided a decent exit opportunity for those who chased the rally in the pre-IPO, followed by a quick surge to 299 Hong Kong dollars, creating space for the main funds to attract early chasing funds. The three-stage decline from 299 Hong Kong dollars to 222 Hong Kong dollars was the result of the concerted selling from the international placement and pre-IPO profit-taking. It is worth noting that four cornerstone investors (totalling around 3.02 million shares, accounting for 35.9% of the global offering, with a lock-up period of 6 months) passively endured the evaporating market value as the stock price dropped from 299 Hong Kong dollars to around 200 Hong Kong dollars during the sell-off on the first day. The afternoon consolidation indicates that most of the selling pressure was cleared out by the end of the first day, and the market temporarily entered a vacuum period of uncertainty between long and short positions. On the next day (May 6), the market gave a crucial validation. After opening high at 220 Hong Kong dollars and quickly dropping, hitting a new low of 191.2 Hong Kong dollars since listing, showing exacerbated panic, but then a deep V rebound followed, closing at 217.8 Hong Kong dollars, up 1.30% from the previous close, with a rebound of 13.9% from the low. This trend aligns closely with broker-dealer seat data: foreign and Chinese large institutions such as HSBC, Goldman Sachs, CCB International had a net purchase of about over 78,000 shares, while internet retail brokers represented by Futu and Huasheng had a net selling of about 41,000 shares, displaying a clear pattern of "institutional uptake, retail exodus." Futu Securities sold 35,100 shares net, being the largest seller, and its behavior was completely consistent with retail stop-losses in the V-shaped rebound. At the same time, the turnover rate dropped drastically from 5.91% on the first day to 0.88%, indicating a significant reduction in panic selling intensity and the beginning of chip settlement. In conclusion, the rollercoaster market of CHONG KIN GP over two trading days can be summarized as follows: from the "liquidity illusion" created by the 7823 times oversubscription in the pre-IPO stage to the brutal long and short killings on the first day without the green shoe mechanism, to the institutions picking up chips against the panic sentiment on the second day. In the future, as the lock-up period of cornerstone investors and the further sedimentation of market sentiment, whether CHONG KIN GP can match its "domestic sports medicine first stock" halo with performance will be the touchstone for determining the outcome of this game.