Group‑Buying “Infinite War”: Meituan, Douyin, and JD.com Compete for Traffic Allocation

The current surge in group‑buying activity is not driven by a single breakthrough technology but by platforms rediscovering the value of embedding local merchants’ discount coupons directly into users’ mobile experiences. Douyin’s “Dou Shengsheng” reached over 20 million monthly active users within two months, while JD.com prominently placed its group‑buying channel on the JD Seconds homepage, claiming participation from one million dining outlets. Taobao has prioritized group‑buying access, Amap integrates offers into navigation, Kuaishou expands quietly in lower‑tier markets, and Baidu has reentered local services for a third attempt. What appears to be a crowded “to‑store group‑buying” market is effectively a modern iteration of the 2011 “Thousand Group War,” but with far larger, well‑capitalized incumbents competing for control of consumer decision pathways over the next decade.

The scale of the opportunity helps explain the intensity of the competition. iResearch projects China’s local life services market will reach RMB 35.3 trillion by 2025, growing at a compound annual rate of 12.6%, yet online penetration is expected to rise only from 12.7% in 2021 to 30.8% in 2025. This implies that more than two‑thirds of transactions—roughly RMB 25 trillion—remain offline, representing a substantial reservoir of untapped traffic and data. To‑store group‑buying is particularly attractive because it avoids the fulfillment costs associated with food delivery; it operates as a straightforward O2O model in which coupons are purchased online and redeemed offline, covering scenarios such as banquets, formal dining and leisure activities that delivery cannot serve. Platforms can also repurpose existing assets—rider networks, merchant relations, content ecosystems and map usage—at low marginal cost to monetize this segment, effectively achieving a second monetization of traffic. Regulatory pressure on the food‑delivery sector has further redirected attention to group‑buying: on April 17 the State Administration for Market Regulation issued fines totaling RMB 3.597 billion to seven platforms in connection with “ghost delivery” cases, tightening the environment for subsidy‑driven competition and making group‑buying a comparatively less regulated and more profitable alternative.

The competitive dynamic has shifted from subsidy‑led market share battles to contests over user cognition and traffic allocation. The decisive question is which platform will define the consumer’s default decision path when hunger or demand arises: will users instinctively open Meituan, or will they encounter an offer while browsing Douyin? Meituan’s strength lies in serving explicit, intent‑driven searches—its extensive merchant database, user review system and reliable fulfillment underpin a high conversion and redemption rate. Douyin, by contrast, leverages algorithmic recommendation, creator ecosystems and immersive short‑form content to stimulate unplanned demand; however, its redemption rate in 2025 was approximately 50%, markedly below Meituan’s 80–90%, indicating a substantial gap between impulse orders and completed redemptions. Douyin’s standalone app “Dou Shengsheng” is designed to capture and convert these impulses more effectively. Public data show Douyin’s life‑services GMV reached RMB 850 billion in 2025, up 59% year‑on‑year, with December 2025 alone approaching RMB 100 billion in monthly GMV. Over the 2024–2025 period Meituan’s in‑store market share declined from 61.3% to 59.8%, while Douyin’s share rose from 38.7% to 40.2%.

Other platforms pursue differentiated approaches within the same competitive landscape. Taobao and Amap operate as ecosystem matrices, routing traffic across multiple touchpoints rather than relying on a single app. JD.com follows a “high‑frequency to low‑frequency” conversion strategy, using delivery to acquire users and group‑buying to monetize them, though retention after subsidy withdrawal remains uncertain. Baidu emphasizes an open alliance model focused on information distribution and decision guidance, seeking to avoid heavy‑asset fulfillment competition; its challenge is balancing profit allocation with data sovereignty within alliance structures. Kuaishou concentrates on lower‑tier cities, where growth in local‑life GMV is notable. Xiaohongshu paused its “Xiaohong Card” pilot earlier this year, revealing operational and ground‑team limitations despite the platform’s strengths in content‑driven demand generation.

The boundaries between scenarios, functions and competitors are dissolving. Instant retail, food delivery, to‑store group‑buying and travel are increasingly integrated into a single consumption chain. Navigation apps are evolving into consumption decision platforms: Amap’s “Street Ranking” and Baidu’s AI‑driven lists demonstrate how tool‑oriented applications can become gateways to local commerce, with Amap reporting daily usage of 120 million people for store searches and an initial week‑on‑week traffic increase of 187% for featured small merchants. E‑commerce apps are embedding group‑buying into rapid‑delivery channels, blurring the distinction between online retail and local services. As a result, competition is no longer confined to direct peers; a map provider, a short‑video platform or an e‑commerce operator can all be adversaries in the fight for local‑life traffic allocation.

Artificial intelligence is accelerating this convergence. Meituan’s CEO has identified AI as a strategic opportunity for local services, and the company’s in‑house LongCat model and “Xiaotuan” assistant are intended to reshape local‑service entry points. Douyin has indicated plans to further integrate AI into “Dou Shengsheng,” and Taobao’s “Liaoyuan Deep Cultivation Plan” leverages large models to provide merchants with AI tools. As AI agents evolve, consumer decision paths may become shorter and more automated, with recommendations tailored to mood and context; platforms could increasingly function as back‑end dispatchers for AI‑driven suggestions.

This RMB 35.3 trillion market can accommodate multiple participants but not all contenders. Meituan must execute a successful AI‑led defense to preserve its search‑based advantage; Douyin needs to address its redemption shortfall to convert content traffic into sustainable commercial value; JD.com must demonstrate that its “high‑frequency to low‑frequency” model endures beyond subsidy cycles. The 2026 group‑buying competition is, at its core, a battle for consumer mindshare: platforms with clear differentiation and durable positioning will be best placed to prevail.